It is conceivable that personal identity relations consist in something which is itself neither identical with nor reducible to a spiritual substance nor identical with nor reducible to aggregates or parts of psychologies and physiologies. Y 1 and Y 2 share many properties, but even at the very time the fission operation is completed differ with regards to others, such as spatio-temporal location. Neither is it surprising that virtually everybody holds a pre-theoretical theory of personal identity, if only in the sense of having beliefs about afterlives and the meaning of death. All views which postulate psychological continuity as a necessary condition are false. A third problem for the psychological approach is that it implies, supposedly, that we are not human animals (Ayers 1990; The Bodily and the Somatic Criteria are false (cf. A criterion is a set of non-trivial necessary and sufficient conditions that determines, insofar as that is possible, whether distinct temporally indexed person-stages are stages of one and the same continuant person. (A temporally indexed person-stage is a slice of a continuant person that extends in three spatial dimensions but has no temporal extension. ) To say that C is a necessary condition for E is to say that if E is the case, then C is the case as well, and to say that C is a sufficient condition for E is to say that if C is the case, then E is the case as well. It is doubtful, however, that the indeterminacy of personal identity can be exploited selectively, for physiological and psychological continuity relations are equally indeterminate in a particular range of cases (cf.
Given that the determinacy and factuality premises are accepted, It is hard to believe that we could: If some psychological predicates presuppose personal identity in this way, an account of personal identity which constitutively appeals to such predicates is viciously circular. In response, defenders of the psychological approach have created psychological concepts that share with our ordinary psychological predicates all features except presumptions of personal identity: Since Z shares with X all memories, character traits, and other psychological characteristics, X is identical with Z. Alleged conclusion: Suppose that Paul broke the neighbor's window as a kid, an incident he remembers vividly when he starts working as a primary school teacher in his late 20s. In that case the kid is identical with the primary school teacher and the primary school teacher is identical with the old man; It is not obvious that there is a straightforward relation between them, for everything depends on how the notions of functioning human body and life-sustaining organs are understood. Credit Union offering up thirteen $1,000 scholarships graduating high school official site u. This is not physically possible without damaging the upper brain functions (cf.
Consider the following thought experiment: Body Swap X's brain is transplanted into Y's body. A criterion of personal identity determines for every possible past event e 0 and future event e 2, within the boundaries of an adequate delineation of the modality in question, whether a person X at t 1 is identical with the being that has participated in e 0 and the being that will participated in e 2. Premise 3: As it turns out, however, there may be good reasons to deny both the intrinsicness and the determinacy of personal identity (cf. 3. a.; 3. b. ). While the formal properties of the concept of identity are necessary constraints on our discussion, the truth of our identity judgments is subject to material conditions of correctness, which these formal properties cannot provide. Would we have sufficient reason to believe the brain criterion to be true for members of the tribe in question as well, if we were aware of all facts about their physiologies? However, since these are clearly substantial questions about our persistence, we should not consider ourselves justified to settle the matter by definition.
It does not seem as if any possible thought experiment, irrespectively of how unequivocal our intuitions about it, could redeem this fear. Each of us is identical with a past fetus. Alleged conclusion: Suppose that it is indeterminate that X is identical with Y. The obvious suggestion is that, given that we are dealing with personal identity, these relata are person-stages located at different times. The old man, however, is not identical with the kid. At the near end, the normal case, X at t 1 is fully psychologically and physiologically continuous with Y at t 2, while at the far end X at t 1 is neither psychologically nor physiologically continuous with Y at t 2. The dialectic of such thought experiments, however, requires that a description of the scenario is possible that does not presuppose the identity of the participants in question. Perry 1972). Personal scholarship essays.